




Human Capital and Earnings Inequality  
in Brazil, 1988–1998:  






† Francisco Galrão Carneiro,








This paper undertakes an empirical examination of rates of return to human capital for men in 
Brazil through the period of macroeconomic stabilization and trade liberalization, using data 
from the PNAD household surveys. Simultaneous quintile equations are estimated to gain a 
picture of the impact of human capital on earnings across the hourly earnings distribution. 
We conclude that there is evidence for growing inequality in rates of return to education in 
Brazil. However we find evidence that education is no longer used as a screening device in 
the labor market, but rather rewarded for its innate association with higher productivity. 
Although increases in rates of return to education have been more pronounced at the top of 
the earnings distribution, this has not led to increased inequality. This is because levels of 
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  A far-reaching program of macroeconomic stabilization and rapid liberalization of 
trade in a developing economy are likely to have important and widespread consequences for 
the labor market. However there appears to be little evidence from a number of recent 
examples for the Stolpher-Samuelson theorem that trade liberalization in a developing 
economy will increase the relative demand for relatively abundant low-skilled labor, and so 
reduce income inequality.
1 The Brazilian case has been particularly well-researched and there 
is an emerging conventional wisdom that, despite the upheavals of price and exchange rate 
stabilization and tariff reduction, earnings inequality in Brazil has remained stubbornly high 
between 1980 and the present (Dickerson et al., 2001; Green et al., 2001). One explanation 
for this is that steadily rising average levels of schooling have offset increased demand for 
skilled labor. At first glance this is a persuasive suggestion. In the sample of Brazilian male 
workers used in the present paper, average years of education for men have risen by almost 
one year between 1988 and 1998, and the rate of illiteracy has fallen from 16.6 to 11.6 per 
cent. Research has also established that rates of return to education in Brazil are low for 
primary schooling but very much higher for advanced levels of education. This may 
contribute significantly to Brazil’s highly unequal distribution of earnings (Lam and 
Levinson, 1992). However while this may be true at the mean of the earnings distribution, 
little is known about rates of return across the range of this wide distribution. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that inequality peaked in the late 1980s and has been falling since, in 
contrast to what has happened elsewhere in the developing world and in particular in Latin 
America. If so this points to the possibility that important changes in the levels of and rates of 
return to education have taken place since the late 1980s. Consequently the reform experience 
may have been a very different one for workers in different positions in the income 
distribution. 
 
Protected product markets in the developing world prior to the early 1990s appear to 
have been associated with protected labor markets in Brazil in particular (Carneiro and 
Henley, 1998; Carneiro, 1998).  Liberalization of the economy to overseas trade exposes 
domestic producers significantly to greater product market competition and this in turn serves 
to introduce much stronger forces of competition to the labor market. An important 
consequence of this process is that education ceases to serve as a device for rationing 
(screening) workers’ access to economic rents. Rather education, if it reflects the acquisition 
of internationally marketable skills, begins to be associated with inherent productive 
potential. Whether the benefits of this process accrue more to those with lower or higher 
levels of education is a matter for empirical investigation. In common with other Latin 
American cases, such as Mexico, there is evidence that tariff protection was highest in sectors 
where employment of the least skilled was dominant (Mollick, 2002; Arbache and Corseuil, 
2001). Overall there appears to have been little or no assessment of whether apparently high 
rates of return to formal education represent a genuine return to valuable skills acquired at 
school, or simply reflect the ability of the more educated to signal innately higher 
productivity to the labor market.  
 
  This paper undertakes an empirical examination of these questions through the 
estimation of simultaneous quintile human capital equations. This is in order to gain a picture 
of the impact of human capital on earnings across different point of the distribution of 
earnings in Brazil. This exercise is performed a sample of male workers drawn from 
                                                 





household survey data from before, during and after the stabilization and liberalization 
program of the early 1990s. We conclude that there is evidence for growing inequality in 
rates of return to education in Brazil, but evidence that education is no longer used as a 
screening device in the labor market, but rather rewarded for its innate association with 
higher productivity. Although increases in rates of return to education have been more 
pronounced at the top of the earnings distribution, this has not led to increased inequality. 
This is because levels of education and other labor market-rewarded endowments have 
increased and offset the rate of return effect. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
method used. Section 3 describes the data source used. Section 4 presents results and section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Approach 
 
  An important issue on the productivity of education concerns whether formal 
education acts as a screen, separating more able (and educated) individuals from the less able 
(and educated). The screening hypothesis (Arrow, 1973) observes that at the point of hiring 
workers’ productivity is unknown to employers and argues therefore that employers use 
education as a proxy for latent productivity. In competitive sectors of the labor market 
productivity will matter and so returns to education will be higher. In non-competitive sectors 
of the labor market returns to subsequent education after hiring will be lower. It is therefore 
possible that the value of education as a screen may vary across the earnings distribution 
because of differing degrees of competition. In particular screening may be more important in 
the top of the distribution, where insider power may be more important.  
 
  The empirical literature on screening distinguishes between the weak form and strong 
form of the hypothesis (Psacharopoulos, 1979; Arabsheibani and Rees, 1998). The weak form 
states that employers will pay a higher initial salary to recruits with higher levels of 
education, but is agnostic about the shape of the subsequent experience-earnings profile. The 
strong form states that employers will continue to pay high salaries even after observing 
working on the job, because education continues to enhance productivity as experience on the 
job rises. However the experience-earnings profiles of an educated worker will converge over 
time with that of a non-educated worker, as the original hiring “mistake” is gradually 
corrected. Psacharopoulos (1979) proposes what has become known as the P(sacharopoulos) 
test as a method of empirical investigation. 
 
  Assume that log hourly earnings for individual i,  yi , are determined according a 




where S is years of education, E is years of experience, Z are other socio-economic variables 
affecting earnings, aj and b are coefficients and u is a disturbance term. The inclusion of the 
interaction term between years of education and years of experience provides a 
straightforward test of convergent experience-earnings profiles under the strong screening 
hypothesis (Lee, 1980). If the hypothesis holds then a5 < 0, otherwise a5 ≥ 0. 
 
Previous research has shown that modeling average earnings (i.e. OLS) fails to reveal 
that the effect of education on earnings is non-constant across the conditional wage 









distribution (Buchinsky, 1994, 1998; Machado and Mata, 2001; Bauer and Haisken-DeNew, 
2001; Hartog, Pereira and Vieira, 2001). This reinforces the need to investigate the screening 
hypothesis across the earnings distribution. An appropriate empirical strategy is to fit the 
earnings model across different points in the conditional sample distribution, using the 
quintile regression method. This was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Assume 
yi , i = 1,…,n, is a sample of observations on log earnings, and that Xi is a K x 1 vector 
comprising the education, experience and other control characteristics contained on the right-




where Quintθ(yi | Xi) denotes the quintile θ of log earnings conditional on the regressor vector. 
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978), the regression quintile θ can be defined as the 











Estimation is by minimizing the sum of weighted absolute deviations and can be 
performed using linear programming methods (Buchinsky 1998). An estimated variance-
covariance matrix for the chosen system of quintile regressions is obtained using a bootstrap 
re-sampling method using Stata Release 7 (StataCorp 2001). Quintile regression coefficients 
can be interpreted by considering the partial derivative of the conditional quintile with respect 
to a particular regressor. This equates to the marginal change in the θth conditional quintile 
due to a marginal change in the regressor. It is however important to note that a sample 
individual who is in the θth conditional quintile may no longer remain in that quintile if his or 
her characteristic measured by the particular regressor changes. So, for example, rates of 
return to additional years of schooling or experience as captured by the estimated coefficients 
apply to an individual remaining in a particular conditional quintile. 
 
3. Data Source and Description 
 
The present paper uses data drawn from the 1988, 1992 and 1998 Brazilian household 
surveys (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD). The PNADs are a series of 
nationally representative household surveys conducted more or less annually since 1976, 
using a consistent methodology by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastistica (IBGE). 
All members of each household over ten years in age are asked detailed questions concerning 
their labor market activity during one week in September. Each survey covers a nationally 
representative sample of households. The sample size has risen progressively from 69,066 
households in 1988, to 94,171 in 1992 and 112,434 in 1998. The present paper draws from 
these households the sample of employed men between the ages of 18 and 65, who report 
earnings and hours of work data and information on human capital and the other controls 
used for estimation purposes. This results in a sample of 65,002 in 1988, 67,880 in 1992 and 
74,003 in 1998. The 63% increase in the number of households sampled over the decade 
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appears, therefore, to have resulted in better coverage of households with fewer or no 
employed males. 
 
Hourly earnings are defined as reported monthly earnings divided by 4.33 and then 
divided by reported weekly hours of work. Table 1 reports summary descriptive information 
for each year on log (hourly earnings), along with descriptive statistics on years of education, 
years of experience
2 (defined as age - (6 + years of schooling)) and the regional, 
metropolitan, urban and racial composition of the samples. Real hourly earnings fall between 
1988 and 1992 but rise thereafter. The standard deviation in hourly earnings drops somewhat 
over the period, particularly between 1988 and 1992. This narrowing in the male earnings 
distribution is further apparent in the movement in the gap between the 75
th and 25
th 
percentiles, and in particular in the narrowing in the gap between the 90
th and 10
th percentiles, 
shown at the bottom of the Table. 
 
Sample average years of schooling increase by 0.9 years between 1988 and 1998. 
Undoubtedly this is the result of younger more educated male cohorts entering the labor 
force. There is also a reduction in average experience of just over 1 year between 1988 and 
1998. In part this is consistent with the increase of the average length of time spent in 
education. However the mean and median product of education and experience both show a 
marked increase. 
 
  Figures 1 to 3 describe the log hourly earnings distribution in each year through the 
estimation of univariate Kernel density functions.
3 Vertical lines of each figure identify the 





th percentiles of the distribution in each case. Visual 
inspection reveals that the dispersion of these percentile points narrows over time. A further 
feature of note is that in 1988 and in 1992 in particular the shape of the distribution reveals a 
mode at almost exactly the 25
th percentile. However by 1998 the shape of the distribution 
changes considerably, with the mode moving much closer to the median. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
  Key results (coefficients a1 to a5) for earnings function estimates for 1988, 1992 and 
1998 are presented in Table 2. For each year the table firstly shows OLS estimates and then 





th quintiles. For 
each year a Wald test for the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients across the 
quintiles is decisively rejected. The reported coefficients suggest considerable variation in the 
education-earnings and experience-earnings profiles at the different points in the earnings 
distribution. We shall discuss rates of return to education and experience shortly. 
 
  The education-experience interaction coefficient is negatively signed and statistically 
significant at the sample mean (OLS) and for the 10
th, 75
th and 90
th conditional quintiles for 
1988 and 1992. However at the sample mean (OLS) and for every quintile below the 90
th the 
coefficient is positively signed and statistically significant. This suggests that prior to the mid 
1990s for those at the very bottom and those in the higher part of the earnings distribution 
                                                 
2 The 1992 and 1998 surveys provide information on experience with the current employer. 
However the explanatory power of the earnings equations are substantially lower using this 
definition. 
3 Estimated using the Epanechnikov kernel estimator with 200 evaluation points over range 





formal education appears to have acted as a signal for innate ability rather than provided 
human capital. Experience-earnings profiles appear to converge, albeit slowly, after initial 
hiring. However by 1998 there appears to have been a shift in the way the labor market 
functions, with education having more inherent productivity-enhancing value.
4 
 
  Tables 3 and 4 report rates of return to additional years of education and experience 
respectively, for each year at the mean (OLS) and for each conditional quintile. Marginal 
rates of return are calculated for levels of education and experience spread across the sample 
range. The estimates reveal that rates of return to additional years of education are much 
higher at already high levels of education. So for example an additional year of education for 
someone with only 2 years of formal education will yield a 12 to 13 percent increase in 
earnings at the mean in 1988, a 10 to 11 percent increase in 1992 and only a 7 to 8 percent 
increase in 1998. By contrast at the higher levels of initial education the rates of return to 
additional education are much higher: 23 to 24 percent at the mean in 1988, 20 to 22 percent 
in 1992 and rising to 26 percent in 1998. Clearly education to college level has become 
significantly more valuable in the labor market by the late 1990s. The “stretching out” of 
returns at the top end of the distribution, and at the top of the range of education and 
experience arises because of the change in the sign of the interaction effect between the two, 
indicative of a move from non-competitive screening behavior for more highly paid jobs, to a 
genuinely competitive labor market in which education is rewarded because of its association 
with productivity. 
 
Table 3 also reveals that rates of return to an additional year of education are between 
4 and 7 percentage points higher at the 90
th quintile compared to the 10
th. If this fact is 
combined with the change over time in the marginal rate of return to education, it makes for 
growing inequality in the returns to education and points to a very important force for greater 
earnings inequality. However set against this we must also note, from Table 1, that average 
levels of education in the male population have been rising over the period in question. An 
increased supply of educated workers does not appear to have compressed earnings. Rather 
the increase in demand for skills appears to have outstripped the increase in supply, with the 
effect that the price has risen. The Brazilian economy appears, in the mid 1990s, to have 
moved from one in which at the top of the earnings distribution, education is used to signal 
inherent ability to one where education has become genuinely productive. 
 
Table 4 shows how marginal rates of return to experience change over the sample 
range. There are three features to the Table.  Firstly rates of return fall sharply as experience 
increases – an indication of the quantitative importance of the statistically significant squared 
term in experience in all the reported regressions. Between 30 and 40 years of accumulated 
experience additional experience starts to attract a negative rate of return, albeit a very small 
one. Secondly there is a progressive, though again small, decline in the marginal return to 
experience over time, particularly between 1988 and 1992. So for example a man in with 11 
years of education and 10 years of experience at the median of the earnings distribution saw 
the marginal return to the 11
th year of experience fall from 5.3 percent to 4.2 percent between 
1988 and 1992. At the lower quintiles the fall appears to have persisted beyond 1992. This 
may be indicative of rapid change in the economy, as new skills become important and 
experience less so. Thirdly a marginal gain in experience is more highly rewarded at the top 
of the earnings distribution compared to the bottom. So for example a man with 11 years of 
                                                 
4 1998 does not appear to be an “rogue” observation in this respect. We find identically 





education and 10 years of experience at the 10
th quintile enjoyed a marginal return of 4.2 
percent to an additional year of experience in 1988. At the 90
th quintile the return would have 
been 6.5 percent. There is a similar difference across the distribution, although at lower 
absolute levels, in 1992 and 1998. 
 
In Table 5 we report the different quintiles of the earnings distribution for each year, 
along with various inter-quintile differences. Actual values from each empirical distribution 
are reported in columns (1), (3) and (6). Between 1988 and 1992 the distribution shifts 
leftwards – at all points reported in the distribution, except the 25
th percentile, workers 
experienced falls in real earnings. Between 1992 and 1998 the reverse is true. Columns (2), 
(4) and (7) report conditional quintiles computed from the regression model estimates, setting 
years of education, experience and the other controls to their average values. In effect these 
columns show a hypothetical earnings distribution under conditions in which all individuals 
have identical human capital and other characteristics. The difference between the actual and 
corresponding conditional distribution shows the extent to which inequality arises due to 
differences in endowed characteristics. A comparison of the 90-50 gaps with the 50-10 gaps 
shows that differences in endowed characteristics are much more important in the top half of 
the earnings distribution. Columns (5), (8) and (9) report points on counterfactual 
distributions that show how earnings would have looked in 1992 and 1998 if average levels 
of human capital and other characteristics had remained unchanged from the early year(s). 
The purpose of this is to decompose shifts in the predicted distribution into a component 
caused by changes in endowed characteristics from that caused by changes in the rates of 
return to education, experience and the other characteristics. If all men had 1988 average 
endowed characteristics in 1992 then the 90-10 gap would have been 1.87 rather than 1.82, 
with the difference more pronounced in the top half of the distribution (90-50 gap) than in the 
bottom half (50-10 gap). If all men had 1988 average endowed characteristics in 1998 then 
the 90-10 gap would have been 1.92 rather than 1.71. Here the difference is apparent in both 
the top and the bottom of the distribution, much is still greater in the 50-10 gap. Consequently 
we see that improved human capital has contributed to the narrowing in earnings inequality 
over the ten-year period. 
 
Table 6 illustrates this decomposition exercise further by showing the changes in the 
actual (empirical) distributions and in the conditional distributions between 1988 and 1992, 
1992 and 1998 and 1988 and 1998. Between 1988 and 1992 the real negative growth in 
earnings is sharpest at the top of the distribution (column 1), and this is what causes 
inequality to fall between these years. Column (2) shows that the same is true in the 
movement in the conditional distribution. The change in average levels of endowed 
characteristics hits those at the top of the distribution hardest. On the other hand if we hold 
mean characteristics fixed at their 1988 levels, as in column (3), then we find that improved 
rates of return to human capital and attributes benefit workers across the distribution. 
However, this benefit is larger at the bottom than at the top. Between 1992 and 1998 all 
points in the distribution experience real earnings growth of between 17 and 25 per cent. 
However the changes in the conditional distribution, reported in column (5), are largest at the 
bottom, and fall steadily as we move up. Consequently improvements in human capital and 
other characteristics have, since 1992, had most benefit for the lowest paid workers. On the 
other hand column (6) reveals that higher rates of return to characteristics have most benefit 
on earnings for those higher up the earnings distribution. Over the full ten-year period those 
at the bottom of the distribution have enjoyed fastest real earnings growth (column 7). The 
reason for this in clear in column (8) – they have benefited most from the general 





have also seen some improvement in rates of return, particularly those around the 25
th 





  This paper has conducted an empirical investigation of the impact of education and 
experience across the earnings distribution for Brazilian men over the period of recent 
macroeconomic and trade reform. Rates of return to additional years of schooling are very 
high in Brazil and at the average vary between 7 and 26 per cent per year depending on levels 
of experience and prior education. However, rates of return to additional education are 
typically 4 to 7 percentage points higher at the 90
th percentile of the earnings distribution 
compared to the 10
th percentile. We find strong evidence of growing inequality in returns to 
additional years of education through the period under investigation. Since the 1980s skills 
have become more highly rewarded and seniority (experience) less so. Overall our results 
point to improved forces of competition in the labor market particular since 1992. This is 
particularly so because there appears to have been a shift in the role of educational 
qualifications from rationing or screening workers into better paid jobs towards education 
being rewarded because of their inherent association with higher productivity. This appears to 
be particularly the case in the top and bottom, as opposed to the center, of the distribution. 
 
If the story ended there then we would expect to find strong evidence for growing 
earnings inequality. However this has not been a consequence of economic reform in Brazil. 
The reason is because significant improvements in levels of human capital have taken place, 
and these have contributed to a narrowing of earnings inequality. Between 1988 and 1992 
during the period of high inflation and abortive stabilization attempts real earnings fell for 
almost all. These falls were most severe further up the earnings distribution. Improvements in 
levels of human capital and other remunerated characteristics were of most benefit to the less 
well paid, particularly since 1992. These improvements were significant enough to offset the 
adverse distributional impact of increased rates of return to education at the top of the 
distribution. Trade liberalization appears to have stimulated the acquisition of human capital 
for the less well paid. Higher rates of return, combined with an increased recognition that 
educational qualifications are of inherent value rather than of use purely as a signaling 
device, may well have stimulated increased human capital investment, alongside government 
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  Mean S.D.  Median  Mean S.D.  Median  Mean S.D.  Median 
Log  (hourly  earnings)  0.447 1.090 0.351 0.375 1.015 0.294 0.596 1.008 0.498 
Education  (years)  5.440 4.368 4.000 5.651 4.310 5.000 6.332 4.357 5.000 
Experience  (years)  23.839 13.654 21.000 22.938 13.292 21.000 22.845 13.206 21.000 
Education*Experience  99.411 93.775 78.000  101.661 93.570 81.000  117.259 102.804 96.000 
Region: North  0.082  0.274 0 0.065  0.246 0 0.071  0.257 0 
  Centre  East 0.129  0.335 0 0.114  0.317 0 0.118  0.322 0 
  South  0.161  0.368 0 0.186  0.389 0 0.184  0.387 0 
  North  East  0.286  0.452 0 0.270  0.444 0 0.282  0.450 0 
Metropolitan  0.407  0.491 0 0.397  0.489 0 0.397  0.489 0 
Urban  0.777  0.416 1 0.814  0.389 1 0.820  0.384 1 
Race:   Black  0.055  0.228 0 0.058  0.235 0 0.062  0.242 0 
  Mixed  0.417  0.493 0 0.406  0.491 0 0.410  0.492 0 
           
Log (hourly earnings)q90  







Log (hourly earnings)q75  
















 1988  1992 
  OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 




























































































































              
N  65002 67880 
R
2/Pseudo R
2  0.484 0.229 0.248 0.291 0.327 0.339 0.448 0.227 0.230 0.270 0.296 0.306 
Wald χ






Table 2 (continued) 
 
 1998 
  OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
































































        
N  74003 
R
2/Pseudo R
2  0.490 0.217 0.264 0.303 0.335 0.341 
Wald χ
2 (19)   155.84 
 
Notes: All equations also include four regional dummy variables, dummy variables for metropolitan and urban status, dummy variables for racial 
group (black, mixed raced) and interactions of the race dummies with schooling and with experience. Full results available on request. 
Simultaneous quintile regression standard errors obtained by bootstrapping (100 replications). Wald is a test for combined equality of the 
reported schooling and experience coefficients across all quintiles. * denotes significance at 5% or less; + denotes significance at 10%. 
 






Estimated Rates of Return to an Additional Year of Schooling 
 
Years: 1988  1992 
Education  Experience   OLS  Q10  Q25 Q50 Q75  Q90  OLS  Q10 Q25  Q50  Q75 Q90 
2 10  0.130  0.099  0.092 0.117 0.146  0.169  0.107  0.090 0.086  0.095  0.119 0.126 
2 20  0.126  0.093  0.093 0.117 0.144  0.164  0.103  0.084 0.084  0.095  0.116 0.122 
2 30  0.122  0.088  0.095 0.117 0.141  0.158  0.099  0.079 0.082  0.094  0.112 0.118 
2 40  0.118  0.082  0.096 0.118 0.138  0.152  0.095  0.073 0.081  0.093  0.109 0.114 
6 10  0.162  0.129  0.136 0.159 0.179  0.190  0.139  0.113 0.120  0.134  0.153 0.160 
6 20  0.158  0.123  0.137 0.159 0.177  0.185  0.135  0.107 0.118  0.134  0.149 0.156 
6 30  0.154  0.118  0.139 0.159 0.174  0.179  0.130  0.102 0.117  0.133  0.146 0.152 
6 40  0.150  0.112  0.140 0.159 0.172  0.173  0.126  0.096 0.115  0.132  0.142 0.149 
11 10  0.202  0.167  0.191 0.211 0.221  0.217  0.178  0.141 0.163  0.183  0.195 0.203 
11 20  0.198  0.161  0.192 0.211 0.218  0.211  0.174  0.136 0.161  0.182  0.191 0.199 
11 30  0.194  0.156  0.193 0.212 0.216  0.205  0.170  0.130 0.160  0.181  0.188 0.195 
11 40  0.190  0.150  0.195 0.212 0.213  0.200  0.165  0.125 0.158  0.181  0.184 0.192 
16 10  0.243  0.205  0.245 0.264 0.262  0.243  0.217  0.170 0.206  0.232  0.237 0.246 
16 20  0.238  0.199  0.247 0.264 0.260  0.237  0.213  0.164 0.205  0.231  0.234 0.242 
16 30  0.234  0.194  0.248 0.264 0.257  0.232  0.209  0.159 0.203  0.230  0.230 0.238 






Table 3 (continued) 
 
Years: 1998 
Education Experience  OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75  Q90 
2 10  0.070  0.047 0.050 0.061 0.085  0.101 
2 20  0.072  0.049 0.055 0.067 0.088  0.101 
2 30  0.075  0.051 0.060 0.074 0.091  0.102 
2 40  0.077  0.054 0.066 0.080 0.093  0.103 
6 10  0.123  0.095 0.103 0.120 0.140  0.151 
6 20  0.126  0.098 0.109 0.127 0.143  0.152 
6 30  0.128  0.100 0.114 0.133 0.146  0.153 
6 40  0.131  0.103 0.119 0.139 0.148  0.153 
11 10  0.190  0.157 0.171 0.194 0.209  0.214 
11 20  0.193  0.159 0.176 0.201 0.212  0.215 
11 30  0.195  0.162 0.181 0.207 0.215  0.216 
11 40  0.197  0.164 0.187 0.213 0.217  0.216 
16 10  0.257  0.218 0.238 0.268 0.278  0.277 
16 20  0.259  0.220 0.243 0.275 0.281  0.278 
16 30  0.262  0.223 0.248 0.281 0.284  0.279 
16 40  0.264  0.225 0.254 0.287 0.286  0.279 
 
 






Estimated Rates of Return to an Additional Year of Experience 
 
Years: 1988  1992 
Education  Experience   OLS  Q10 Q25  Q50  Q75 Q90 OLS  Q10 Q25  Q50  Q75 Q90 
2 10  0.057  0.047 0.045  0.053  0.062 0.070 0.046  0.039 0.038  0.042  0.050 0.056 
2 20  0.036  0.028 0.028  0.034  0.041 0.047 0.029  0.023 0.023  0.027  0.033 0.039 
2 30  0.016  0.009 0.010  0.014  0.019 0.024 0.013  0.007 0.008  0.011  0.015 0.021 
2 40  -0.004  -0.010 -0.007  -0.005  -0.003 0.001 -0.003  -0.009  -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 
6 10  0.055  0.045 0.046  0.053  0.061 0.068 0.044  0.036 0.038  0.042  0.049 0.054 
6 20  0.035  0.026 0.028  0.034  0.040 0.045 0.028  0.021 0.022  0.026  0.032 0.037 
6 30  0.014  0.007 0.011  0.014  0.018 0.022 0.011  0.005 0.007  0.011  0.014 0.019 
6 40  -0.006  -0.012 -0.007  -0.005  -0.004 -0.001 -0.005  -0.011  -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 
11 10  0.053  0.042 0.046  0.053  0.060 0.065 0.042  0.034 0.037  0.042  0.047 0.053 
11 20  0.033  0.023 0.029  0.034  0.038 0.042 0.026  0.018 0.022  0.026  0.030 0.035 
11 30  0.012  0.004 0.011  0.015  0.017 0.019 0.009  0.002 0.006  0.010  0.012 0.017 
11 40  -0.008  -0.015 -0.006  -0.005  -0.005 -0.004 -0.007  -0.014  -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 
16 10  0.051  0.039 0.047  0.053  0.059 0.062 0.040  0.031 0.036  0.041  0.045 0.051 
16 20  0.031  0.020 0.030  0.034  0.037 0.039 0.024  0.015 0.021  0.026  0.028 0.033 
16 30  0.010  0.001 0.012  0.015  0.015 0.016 0.007  -0.001 0.006  0.010  0.011 0.015 






Table 4 (continued) 
 
Years:    1998 
Education Experience  OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75  Q90 
2 10  0.040  0.030 0.033 0.038 0.046  0.052 
2 20  0.026  0.017 0.019 0.024 0.031  0.037 
2 30  0.011  0.003 0.005 0.010 0.015  0.021 
2 40  -0.003  -0.010 -0.008 -0.005 0.000  0.006 
6 10  0.041  0.031 0.035 0.041 0.047  0.052 
6 20  0.027  0.018 0.021 0.026 0.032  0.037 
6 30  0.012  0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016  0.022 
6 40  -0.002  -0.009 -0.006 -0.002 0.001  0.006 
11 10  0.043  0.032 0.037 0.044 0.049  0.053 
11 20  0.028  0.019 0.024 0.030 0.033  0.037 
11 30  0.014  0.006 0.010 0.015 0.018  0.022 
11 40  -0.001  -0.008 -0.003 0.001  0.002  0.007 
16 10  0.044  0.034 0.040 0.047 0.050  0.053 
16 20  0.029  0.020 0.027 0.033 0.035  0.038 
16 30  0.015  0.007 0.013 0.018 0.019  0.022 
16 40  0.000  -0.006 -0.001 0.004  0.003  0.007 
 






 Actual and Conditional Log Hourly Earnings Distributions 
 
 1988  1992  1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Actual  Conditional  Actual  Conditional Conditional  at 
1988 means 




Q10  -0.788  -0.478  -0.805  -0.526 -0.444 -0.550  -0.246 -0.461 -0.369 
Q25  -0.293  -0.043  -0.256  -0.084 -0.013 -0.086  0.148 -0.010 0.073 
Q50  0.351  0.431  0.294  0.368 0.458 0.498  0.577 0.453 0.560 
Q75  1.080  0.924  0.987  0.833 0.949 1.173  1.019 0.927 1.062 
Q90  1.920  1.408  1.706  1.293 1.430 1.935  1.464 1.393 1.550 
               
Q90-Q10  2.708  1.886  2.511  1.819 1.874 2.485  1.711 1.854 1.919 
Q75-Q25  1.373  0.963  1.243  0.917 0.962 1.258  0.871 0.937 0.988 
Q90-Q50  1.569  0.977  1.412  0.925 0.971 1.437  0.888 0.940 0.990 
Q50-Q10  1.139  0.909  1.099  0.894 0.903 1.048  0.823 0.914 0.929 
 








Earnings Growth Across the Distribution 
 
 1988-1992  1992-1998  1988-1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Actual  Conditional Conditional 
at 1988 
means 
Actual  Conditional Conditional 
at 1992 
means 
Actual  Conditional Conditional 
at 1988 
means 
Q10  -0.016  -0.048 0.034 0.254  0.279 0.157 0.238  0.232 0.017 
Q25  0.037  -0.040 0.030 0.170  0.231 0.157 0.207  0.191 0.033 
Q50  -0.057  -0.063 0.027 0.203  0.209 0.192 0.147  0.146 0.022 
Q75  -0.093  -0.091 0.025 0.186  0.186 0.229 0.093  0.095 0.003 
Q90  -0.214  -0.115 0.021 0.229  0.171 0.257 0.015  0.056 -0.015 
 
 





















































Note: vertical lines indicate positions of 10
th, 25
th, 50
th, 75
th and 90
th percentiles. 